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STATE OF UTAH

*
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*
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*
*
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*
APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by the Respondent to collect on
certain promissory notes from the Appellant and to foreclose
on certain mortgages securing the notes and Appellant's
Counterclaim claiming an overpayment of monies.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On April 11, 1977, the case came on regularly for
Trial in the Second Judicial District Court in Davis County
before the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, sitting without a jury,
Upon the conclusion of testimony, the Judge ruled that the
Respondent was entitled to Judgment on all of the issues set:::
in the Complaint, and the Appellant's Counterclaim was
dismissed with prejudice.

That Order was entered on May 16,

1977 and on May 26, 1977, Appellant made a Motion for a
New Trial.
1977.

That Motion was denied by Judge Palmer on June 9,

On July 8, 1977, Appellant moved for a re-hearing on

his Motion for a New Trial and that was denied on July 21, 19i
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant requests the Court to reverse the Trial
Court's decision denying Appellant's Motion for a New Trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case are very long and complex,
but for the purposes of this appeal, can be summarized as foll>
During a period of time from December 12, 1967 to
December 1, 1971, Respondent J.

w.

Broadwater made several

loans to Appellant, Glen Van Tassell.

In exchange for these

loans, Appellant executed and delivered several promissory
notes ~o Respondent.

Each was secured by a separate mortgage.

.
.
epara~
During the course of the dealings, each party kept a s
·
accounting
o f t h e money pai· d on th e 1 oans.

The only issue

raised in the Trial Court and the issue that has been aprP
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1
·

is which accounting is correct.
Respondent kept his accounting on a check size
piece of paper written on both sides (Plaintiff's Exhibit D,
Tr. 11) from this piece of paper, Respondent made summaries
(Plaintiff's Exhibits D, 0 and N, Tr. 21

&

22).

According

to Respondent's testimony, Exhibit D is a complete record
of all the money he ever received from the Appellant (Tr. 32).
Respondent testified that he never gave any receipt to
the Appellant (Tr. 35).
Appellant is in the gas station business.

It is his

practice to keep an accounting of his transactions by the use
of individual receipts.

Whenever a customer would come in and

buy gas or other service station goods or services on credit,
he would write a ticket in triplicate.

He would then give a

copy to the customer and file the other two copies in his
records.

Appellant claims that when Respondent would come into

the station, he would buy gas or accessories and charge them,
then he would ask Appellant if he had any money to pay him on
the notes.

Appellant would get cash out of the till and give

it to the Respondent and then write it down on Respondent's
ticket (Tr. 95).

Appellant introduced 76 such receipts into

evidence (some were for gas and money, others were just for
gas

and accessories) (Tr. 97).
Respondent claims that there is still a total of

$SJ,640. 68 still due on all the notes.

Appellants claim

that there has been an overpayment.
~t

Trial, Respondent produced a handwriting expert,

-C'.b"' • who did some analysis of the tickets introduced into
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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evidence.

It was Mr. Grube' s testimony that on Defendant's

1

Exhibits 16-21, that Respondent's signature was put on prior to
the amount of money supposedly received by Respondent.

Mr.

Grube testified that he had examined more than just Defendant's
Exhibits 16-21, but he could only reach a conclusion on
Exhibits 16-21 (Tr. 170).

Mr. Grube said that he was unable

to determine the time lapse between the two entries (Tr. 176);
he also testified that it would be extremely difficult to
take the ticket out of the machine and then replace the ticket
back in the machine so that the copies would match
identically(Tr. 177).
At the conclusion of the Trial, the Judge delivered
his ruling from the bench.

It was his decision that the

Respondent's accounting was correct in every detail.

In fact,

he even suggested to the Respondent that he contact the
County Attorney's Office and ask for a perjury investigation(Tr
On May 16, 1977, the final Order was entered(Tr. 1391·
On May 26, 1977, Appellant filed a Motion for a New Trial.
That Motion was heard on the same day as another part of the
Trial and was denied.

On July 8, 1977, Appellant filed a

Motion for a Re-Hearing on Defendant's Motion for a New Trial.
This was denied on July 21, 1977.

On July 8, 1977, Appellant

filed his Notice of Appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT'S DECISION AT TRIAL WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED.

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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While it is true that because the Trial was before a
Judge sitting without a jury, the Judge's decision as a trier
of fact and law should be given much deferrence, he cannot
stubbornly ignore and refuse to be guided by credible uncontested
evidence.

DeVas v. Noble,13 Ut.2d 133.
At Trial, there was one piece of evidence that seems

to have been ignored by the Judge, Defendant's Exhibit 13.
Defendant's Exhibit 13 is a receipt that bears the signature
of the Respondent and indicates that the Respondent received
$3,000.00 cash from the Appellant on February 15, 1972.

exhibit is important for a number of reasons.

This

First, since

it does not appear on the Respondent's accounting sheet, it
completely contradicts Respondent's testimony that he did
not receive any other money from the Appellant.

Second, it

contradicts Respondent's testimony that he received only small
amounts of money, $500. 00 or less.

Third, it supports

Appellant's contention that he paid large sums of cash to the
Respondent.

In his deposition (Broadwater Deposition, p. 34),

Respondent denied that he signed Defendant's Exhibit 13.

As

shown from the markings on Defendant's Exhibit 22, Mr. Grube,
the handwriting expert, checked the signature of some of the
tickets to determine if they were authentic.

Mr. Grube never

indicated that Respondent's signature on Defendant's Exhibit 13
was forged.

In fact, he did not testify that any of the

signatures on the 76 tickets were forged.

Further, at Trial,

Respondent would not d irectly
·
·
answer whet h er or not h is
:v;nature appeared on Exhibit 13.

At rrial, when asked to
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identify Defendant's Exhibit 13, Respondent answered, "That
certainly is not my signature, I don't think, it does not
look like it."(Tr. 54).

Later, he said, "I never received a

nickel and I don't think that's my signature."(Tr. 347).
In his deposition, he flatly denied that Exhibit 13 was his
signature.

Later he hired a handwriting expert

to

examine the tickets, and at Trial, he was not sure whether or
not his signature appeared on Exhibit 13.

Respondent, being

aware of Defendant's Exhibit 13, surely had Mr. Grube examine
it and if Mr. Grube had found it to be a forgery, surely he
would have so testified.

On the

other hand, it was Appellant';

firm testimony that Mr. Broadwater signed Defendant's
Exhibit 13(Tr. 105).
The Judge seemed to place heavy reliance on the
fact that Mr. Grube testified that on tickets 16-21, the
amount of money that was supposedly received was written
after the Respondent's signature.

Assuming this to be true,

it still does not controvert the Appellant's testimony.
Appellant testified that on several occasions, Mr. Broadwater
would purchase gas or accessories and then come in and ask
for some money (Tr. 105-106).

on several occasions, he even

bought the gas or accessories from some other employee and the~
came to talk to the Appellant about getting some money on
the notes.

It was Appellant's testimony that all of the

entries on the tickets were made prior to the tickets being
taken out of the machine (Tr. 106).

It is very possible that

Respondent could have signed for the gas and received the
money and just added the amount of money to the already
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Again referring to Mr. Grube' s testimony, he stated that it
would be almost impossible to put the tickets back into the
machine so that the white and yellow copies would match.

In his

Motion for a New Trial, Appellant submitted the yellow sheet
so that the trier of fact could determine if the two copies
matched.

The fact that Respondent's signature was put on

for the amount shown to have been received is meaningless.

The

only issue that matters is whether the amount received by
Respondent was on the ticket when the ticket was taken from
the machine and a copy given to Respondent.

Just because

the signature was put in first does not mean that Respondent
did not receive and acknowledge the receipt of the money.
While there were six tickets that the signature appeared to
have been put on first, there are seventeen tickets, 1-15 and
67 which purport to be receipts of money received by
Respondent, which were not challenged by the Respondent.
Appellant respectfully submits that based on the receipts
presented by Appellant as evidence at Trial, that the Appellant
carried his burden or proof and made a prima facie showing that
he paid a large sum of money to the Respondent.

That prima facie

showing has not been rebutted by Respondent and therefore,
the ruling of the Trial Court was erroneous.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS ERRONEOUS •
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
ln

Part, that :

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a New Trial
may be granted to all or any of the parties and
all or part of
the issues for any of the followion
.
nc
causes; provided, however, that on a Motion for a·
New Trial in an action tried without a jnry, the
Court may open the Judgment, if one was entered
take additional testimony, amend Findings of Fa~t
and Conclusions of Law or make new Findings and
Conclusions and direct the entry of a new .:rudgment:

(4)
Newly discovered evidence, material for the
party making the application which could not, with
reasonable dilligence have been discovered and
produced at Trial.
(6)
Insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the verdict or other decision or that it is
against law.
Appellant's original Motion for a New Trial was
not property heard.
was to be heard.

There was never any notice that the Motio:

The Trial was bifurcated into two hearings,

one as to the issue of the notes and mortages and the other
one as to the ownership of the ten foot strip of land surround::
the Appellant's service station.

The Trial on the notes and

mortgages was heard first on April 11, 1977.
1977, the second Trial was held(Tr. 405).

On June 9,

At that time, the

Trial Judge sua sponte brought up the Motion for a New Trial
and sUI1UUarily denied it.

Appellant's counsel was not given

notice to prepare for that hearing and as a result, was not
given an opportunity to be adequately heard.
In order to remedy the injustice, Appellant filed a
Motion for a Re-Hearing of the Motion for a New Trial.

Whil'.

rules of civil procedure do not provide for a Motion for
re-hearing, the Court should have allowed it on one of r·..;~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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orounds.

First, since the Appellant did not have proper notice

of the original Motion, he should be given an opportunity to
be heard.

Second even if the Motion for re-hearing was improper,

the requirements 6f Rule 60 were met and the Court should have
considered the Motion for re-hearing as a Motion for relief
b
from Judgment under Rule 60B.
In the case of Durrey v. Lunford,
18 ut. 2d 74, 4J.5 P2d 662, the Court in holding that the motion
to reconsider a denial of a new trial was improper, said:
The rules of civil procedure do not provide for a
motion to reconsider or review its ruling g£anting
or denying a motion for a new trial and where the
requirements of Rule 60 are not met, the Court
has not the authority to entertain or grant a
motion to reconsider.
·
In the present case, the requirements of Rule 60 were met and
thus, the Court did have authority to hear and grant Appellant's
second Motion.

Rule 60b provides in part that:

The Court may in the furtherance of justice,
relieve a party or his legal representative from
a final Judgment, Order or proceeding for the
following reasons(l) mistake, inadvertance, surprise
or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due dilligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial
under 59B; ...
As to item

(1)

in Rule 60 (b), since the Court brought the

original Motion for a New Trial sua sponte without notice in
advance of the hearing, Appellant did not have the opportunity
to adequately prepare for that hearing and as a result, was
truly surprised and any neglect on his part

should be excused.

This being the case, i tern ( 2) clearly applies in that the
'·

2

\·rly discovered evidence could not have been presented timely
1

·c, '·

"

2

n ?inal Motion for a New Trial, since Appellant was not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was not informed of the time of hearing.

It is the Appellant',

position that the Motion for re-hearing on the Defendant's
motion for a new trial was justified.
In ruling on a Motion for a New Trial, the Trial
decision should be given much deferrence.
Railroad Co., 117 Ut. 40, 212 P2d 692.
cannot be allowed to

11

Jue~;

King v. Union Paci[:

But again the Judge

stubbornly ignore and re fuse to be guided

by credible, uncontradicted evidence when all reasonable minds
would accept it.

DeVas v. Noble, supra at 137.

11

The primary

concern of the Court in deciding whether to grant a new trial
on the basis of newly discovered evidence is that justice
be done. Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Ut. 122, 247 P2d 264. If the
Judge finds that on the basis of the newly discovered evidence
that there is a reasonable likelihood that the resti.lt would be
different, he should grant a new trial.

See Browers v. Gray,

99 Ut. 336, 106 P2d 765; Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Ut. 381, 105 P2i.
Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Ut.

347, 57 P2c 708.

In the present

case, there were three pieces of newly discovered evidence
presented in Appellant's Motion for a New Trial that were
uncontested and concousively show that Respondent's accountinq
was incomplete.

~·

March 20, 1970.

In his second motion for a new trial, Appellai::

Check from Appellant to Respondent dated

submitted as newly discovered evidence a check dated March 20,
1970 from Appellant to Respondent for $100.00 ( R. 442).

ThlS

exhibit was submitted and was not challenged by Respondent and
the check was endorsed by the Respondent.

The check does not

appear on Respondent's accounting slip (Plaintiff's Exhibit D'
In his testimony, Respondent stated that all the money he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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received from Appellant was listed on his accounting slip, but
this check shows conclusively that the accounting is not
totally correct.

~.

Affidayits of Erma Van Tassell and Ronald

Ditrnar (R . 445, R . 451).

At Trial, Ronald Ditmar testified

that he was present at five or six times when he saw Appellant
give Respondent some cash (Tr. 75).

He further testified

that on another occasion, he took several checks from the till
and from Mr. Van Tassell's wallet up to the bank to obtain

cash and after he returned with that cash, he saw Appellant
give that cash to Respondent (Tr. 77-78).

At Trial, Mr. Ditmar

was somewhat hazy on when the events took place and how money
was transferred.

After the Trial, Mr. Di tmar was reminded by

Appellant's wife of a specific time when she was sent up to
the bank to get $2,000.00.

When she returned and counted out

the money, there was only $1,900.00 and Mr. Ditmar was called
in to count the money and verify whether there was $1,900.00

or $2,000.00.

In his Affidavit, Mr. Ditmar states because of

this being brought to his attention, his memory was refreshed
and that in fact,

this event did not t.;i.ke place and the $1,900.00

was given to Respondent ( R. 452) •

This testimony was never

contradicted by Respondent which is important for three
reasons.

First, it shows that Respondent was not willing to

accept checks from Mr. Van Tassell, but rather insisted on cash.
Secondly, again, this $1,900.00 does not appear on the Respondent's
accounting slip, Exhibit D.

Again showing that Respondent's

accounting was not totally correct.
~ort-ra<'icts

·-

"

0

Thirdly, it directly

Respondent's testimony that he never received

r,ercL· .J"e:

$500.00.

£..

Check from Appellant's wife
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wife to Respondent dated November 16, 1969.

Along with Erma

Van Tassell' s Affidavit ( R . 445), was submitted a copy of
a check for $200.00 dated November 11, 1969 from Erma Van
Tassell to Respondent.
Respondent.

This check was also endorsed by

Again the check does not appear on Respondent's

accounting slip and again conclusively shows that Respondent's
accounting was not totally correct.
CONCLUSION

i

The Trial Judge placed too much reliance on the exper:I
testimony of Mr. Grube and as a result was led to believe that :

Mr. Van Tassell had perjured himself.

As a result of this

belief, he failed to consider properly the uncontraverted,
newly discovered evidence presented by Appellant on his
motions for a new trial.

Appellant respectfully submits that

the Trial Judge erred in failing to grant Appellant a New Trial.I
Respectfully Submitted,

'

FULLMER & HARDING

BY

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered two copies of the :
r Respondent, ,!
Appellants' Brief to Allen H. Tibbals, Attorney fo
salt Lai'
Suite 400, Chancellor Building, 220 South Second East,

City, Utah 8411 on this 30th day of September, 1977.
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